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Abstrat: The evolution of the web server ontents and the emergene of
new kinds of intrusions make neessary the adaptation of the intrusion dete-
tion systems (IDS). Nowadays, the adaptation of the IDS requires manual 
tedious and unreative  ations from system administrators. In this paper, we
present a self-adaptive intrusion detetion system whih relies on a set of loal
model-based diagnosers. The redundany of diagnoses is exploited, online, by a
meta-diagnoser to hek the onsisteny of omputed partial diagnoses, and to
trigger the adaptation of defetive diagnoser models (or signatures) in ase of
inonsisteny. This system is applied to the intrusion detetion from a stream
of HTTP requests. Our results show that our system 1) detets intrusion our-
renes sensitively and preisely, 2) aurately self-adapts diagnoser model, thus
improving its detetion auray.
Key-words: intrusion detetion, self-adaptive diagnosis, meta-diagnosis, self-
adaptive system, web appliation intrusion
Système auto-adaptatif de détetion d'intrusions
Web
Résumé : L'évolution du ontenu des serveurs et l'apparition de nouveaux
types d'attaques rend néessaire l'adaptation dynamique des systèmes de dé-
tetion d'intrusion (IDS). De nos jours, les adaptations des IDS néessitent
des interventions manuelles  non-réatives et rébarbatives  de la part des
administrateurs du système. Dans e papier, nous présentons un système de
détetion d'intrusions adaptatif qui repose sur un ensemble de diagnostiqueurs
loaux. Les redondanes entre les diagnostis sont exploitées par un meta-
diagnostiqueur qui surveille, en ligne, la onsistane des diagnostis loaux, et,
lorsqu'une inonsistane est détetée, il délenhe l'adaptation des modèles (des
signatures d'intrusion) utilisés par les diagnostiqueurs inriminés. Ce système
est appliqué à la détetion d'intrusions à partir d'un ot de requêtes HTTP. Les
résultats montrent que notre système 1) détete les intrusions de manière préise
et sensible tout au long de la surveillane, et 2) adapte de manière adéquate ses
modèles de diagnosti et améliore ainsi ses performanes de détetion.
Mots-lés : détetion d'intrusion, diagnosti auto-adaptation, meta-diagnosti,
système auto-adaptatif, intrusion web
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1 Introdution
Computerized systems, personal or professional, publi or private, are more and
more onneted to the world wide web. Sine suh onnetions open aesses
to data that the user wishes to protet, there is an inreasing interest in aess
seurity issues. In order to avoid maliious aesses to, opies of or modiations
of personal data, intrusion detetion systems  IDS  are needed for robustly
and preisely deteting intrusions into the proteted system.
We are interested in IDSs that an detet intrusions on Web servers. Suh
servers are omputer systems that are mostly enountered on the Web [7℄. Sine
they are aessible by everyone, not surprisingly they are among the most at-
taked systems. Some of the ommon tehniques used by attakers to om-
promise a website inlude exploiting a vulnerable Web appliation running on
the server (by attaking through improperly seured input elds), or exploiting
some vulnerability present in the underlying host operating systems. In 2008
alone, Symante identies 12.885 site spei web appliation vulnerabilities.
Aording to this reent study, 63% of vulnerabilities aeted Web appliations
in 2008, an inrease from 59% in 2007. Therefore, the development of Web IDSs
appears to be an important onern to respond to the need of global network
seurity.
On the long term, the ontinuous auray and robustness of an IDS annot
be ensured in real situations without human assistane. In fat, real situations
are not stable, and a major hallenge is the oneption of IDSs having the
apaity to adapt themselves (i.e. with as little human assistane as possible)
to their evolving environment. The environment an evolve in three ways:
 evolution of the Web Server ontent: new pages and servies are added
and removed dynamially. Thus, requests that failed at one time might
be suessful later.
 evolution of the Web Server usage: lients modify their behavior when
using the web server along the time.
 evolution of the intrusions: new kinds of intrusion frequently emerge.
We are partiularly motivated by designing a self-adaptive system to detet
intrusions in Web servers. Considering the evolving environment, the adaptation
of the IDS is required. Current adaptation solutions onsist in updating or
rebuilding some signatures (intrusion signatures or normal behavior signatures).
But those solutions are tedious and unreative beause they are mostly manual.
Updating a signature base requires an expert who has to perform a boring work
to selet the signatures that are suitable for his own server onguration and
ontent. Similarly, rebuilding requires a tedious seletion of signiant trae
from whih the signatures are rebuilt. In both ases, a human interation is
required and the IDS will not be fully funtional until it has been updated or
rebuilt. In ontrast, we would like to devise a self-adaptive Web IDS that ould
trigger it own adaptation without human assistane.
This situation is known as an on-line adaptation task in presene of on-
ept drift [14℄ and is reputed to be diult. The design of self-adaptive IDS
raises two main issues: (1) the autonomous detetion and the diagnosis of the
adaptation requirement, and (2) the eetive adaptation of the system.
INRIA
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We design a multi-diagnoser arhiteture, assoiated to a meta-diagnoser,
that uses integrity onstraints to deide when adaptation is required and whih
diagnoser should adapt. In a multi-diagnoser approah, eah diagnoser agent
onstruts its own diagnosis from subsets of features extrated from the obser-
vations. As they are ground on dierent but partially redundant views of the
system, these diagnoses are supposed to satisfy integrity onstraints. When is
not the ase, i.e. some of the diagnoses are ontraditory, the meta-diagnoser,
aording to a onsensus priniple, detets that the observed system has evolved.
In a rst setion, we present the issue of the diagnosis of an evolving system.
The Setion 2 is dediated to the state of the art of the intrusion detetion from
HTTP requests. Then, in Setion 3, we give an self-adaptive diagnosis frame-
work of the system and in Setion 4, we present our self-adaptive multi-diagnoser
intrusion detetion system. Finally, in Setion 5, we give some experiments and
results.
2 Deteting intrusions from HTTP requests
We are interested in an IDS that an detet intrusions on Web servers. More
preisely, we would like to detet intrusions from HTTP requests that are sub-
mitted to the Web server. Deployed network IDSs (e.g. Snort) have the a-
pability to detet intrusions by analyzing the tra of TCP/IP pakets. As
a onsequene, intruders attak the upper OSI layers, e.g. the appliation OSI
layer. Thus, IDSs dediated to spei appliations seem more relevant to takle
the omplexity of these attaks from the TCP/IP paket point of view. For in-
stane, it is easier to detet a breah in a gi sript from the request than from
the TCP/IP tra. One of the main hallenge is to protet the web server
from known intrusions as well as unknown intrusions while avoiding any tedious
update by the administrators.
In this setion, rstly we introdue the struture of aess logs, then we
present some known intrusions using HTTP requests and nally we briey
present the general idea of HTTP request intrusion detetion.
2.1 Aess logs
All the requests reeived by the server are reorded in the web server aess log
thus a Web IDS an use the aess log to detet intrusions. A log is omposed
of a list of lines. Eah line orresponds to a request submitted to the server and
is a rih strutured soure of information. It has several elds that desribe the
request and the response made by the server to this request. Figure 1 illustrates
the overall struture of a log line provided by an Apahe server (Combined
format). The main elds are:
 IP: the IP address of the lient (remote host) who has sent the request
to the server. The IP address reported here is not neessarily the address
of the mahine at whih the user is sitting. If there exists a proxy server
between the user and the server, this address will be the address of the
proxy, rather than the address of the soure mahine.
 Time: the time at whih the server nished proessing the request.
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 Request: the request line from the lient is given in double quotes. The
request line ontains many useful piees of information. First, it ontains
the method used by the lient (e.g. GET, POST, . . . ). Seond, it ontains
the requested resoures (inluding the potential sripts parameters), and
third, it ontains the protool used by the lient (e.g. HTTP/1.0).
 Status ode: the status ode that the server sent bak to the lient. It
indiates the kind of response the server made to the request. For example,
odes beginning with 2 indiate a suessful response, odes beginning
with 4 indiate an error aused by the lient, . . . The full list of possible
status odes an be found in the HTTP speiation (RFC2616 setion
10).
 Size: this eld gives the size of the objet returned to the lient.
 Referrer: this eld gives the site that the lient reports having been
referred from (- if not available).
 User agent: The User-Agent is the identifying information that the lient
browser reports about itself. Espeially, this eld an be used to identify
the robots.
Figure 1: Apahe log line examples. The session of IP 69.12.60.15 ontains 2
requests.
A lient session an be rebuilt from log lines by olleting the set of requests
submitted by a same lient (identied by his IP) to the server in a limited time
window. The reonstruted session does not neessarily represent the omplete
lient ativity [16℄ as ahe mehanisms may hide some requests. But in order
to detet intrusions, the most interesting requests are those that are submitted
to the server. Nonetheless, a proxy may hide an intruder behind a shared IP.
We will use sessions as an alternative point of view on the urrent request.
2.2 Intrusion using HTTP requests
AWeb server an be intruded by an attaker who sends a suitable HTTP request
or a suitable suession of HTTP requests. Firstly, we give some simple HTTP
request attaks, then we present some attaks using several requests.
Some simple attaks make use of sripts for unauthorized aess to proteted
information suh as:
 passwords (e.g. .htaess le),
 database (e.g. data insertion),
 information about the loal area network (e.g. request to system om-
mands or aess to log les),
INRIA
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192.168.0.0 - - [13/Jan/2006:01:07:21 -0200℄ "GET /awstats/
awstats.pl?onfigdir=|eho;eho%20YYY;d%20%2ftmp%3bwget
...;eho%20YYY;eho|HTTP/1.0" 404 291
192.168.0.0 - - [14/Jan/2006:01:01:25 -0200℄ "GET /gi-bin/
awstats.pl?onfigdir=|eho;eho%20YYY;d%20%2ftmp%3bwget
...;eho%20YYY;eho|HTTP/1.0" 200 291
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:46 -0300℄ "GET /rp/..%%35%63
..%%35%63..%%35%63..%%35%63/winnt/system32/md.exe?/+dir+
:\\+/OG HTTP/1.0" 400 294
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:47 -0300℄ "GET /gi-bin/%2E
%2E%2F%2E%2E%2F%2E%2E%%4E%4E%54%2F%73%79%73%74%65%6D%33%32
%2Fping.exe%20127.0.0.1
192.168.0.1 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:43 -0300℄ "GET /gi-bin/
mrtg.gi?fg=/../../../../../../winnt/win.ini HTTP/1.0"
404 289
192.168.0.2 - - [12/Apr/2006:08:05:43 -0300℄ "GET /gi-bin/
mrtg.gi?fg=/../../../../../../et/passwd HTTP/1.0"
404 289
Figure 2: Intrusion examples. Intrusions from IP 192.168.0.0 are based on
the awstat sript, intrusions from IP 192.168.0.1 try to illegally exeute system
ommands and intrusions from IP 192.168.0.2 try to aess to passwords.
 information about the ompany ativities (e.g. unauthorized browse of
diretories).
Another ommon intrusion is the SQL injetion where the intruder attempts
to orrupt a SQL database. In suh ase, the intruder attempts to exeute some
SQL ommands like selet, where or from using the HTTP request. The same
applies to attempts to exeute system ommands like at, grep, wget, dir, ls,
et. Spei haraters like spaes, new lines or null terminators are widely used
(and neessary) on most attempts to exeute ommands. To detet intrusion, it
is interesting to look for these spei haraters, but intruders often hide those
haraters using enoded URLs. In an enoded URL, the spei haraters are
enoded using hexadeimal odes, e.g. '%20' enodes a spae (f. Figure 2).
Figure 2 illustrates some awstats attaks. We see some ommon system
ommands, separators and some enoded haraters in the URL. Looking at
the HTTP result ode, we know that one was suessfull and the other was not
(error 404 and 200).
Some omplex intrusions require several HTTP requests. In their seurity
threat report [9℄, Symante notied inreasing of omplexity and sophistiation
of attaks. while a single high-seurity aw an be exploited to fully ompromise
a user, attakers are now frequently stringing together multiple exploits for
medium vulnerabilities to aheive the same goal. For example, a ategory of
attaks onsists in using a software seurity hole to install maliious software
that will generate unauthorized tra on the server. Another example  and
the best known attak of web servers  is the DoS attak whih onsists in
overooding a server with maliious requests or with requests that generate an
internal error. A DoS attak provokes a system failure where the server is no
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more able to respond to non-intrusive requests. In suh ases, the analysis of
only one request may not be suient to detet an attak and the analysis of a
session may be required.
2.3 Intrusion Detetion Systems analyzing HTTP requests
The tehniques for intrusion detetion fall into two major ategories: signature-
based detetion and anomaly-based detetion. Signature-based detetion (e.g. Snort
[20℄, ModSeurity [19℄) identies maliious behavior by mathing a behavior pro-
le against pre-dened desriptions of attaks. Anomaly detetion [8℄, on the
other hand, denes a prole of a subjet's normal behavior and attempts to
identify any unaeptable deviation as the result of a potential attak. The rst
ategory of tehniques has good preision and sensibility for known intrusions
but has diulties to deal with new kinds of intrusions. In fat, a new kind
of intrusion will not be deteted, sine its own signature is not in the intrusion
signature base. On the other hand, anomaly-based tehniques an easily detet
unknown attaks, but their usage generates a lot of false-positive alarms.
Signature-based intrusion detetion tehniques are widely used forWeb server
intrusion detetion. The request reeived by the Web server are suessively
ompared with the signatures of maliious requests. Consequently, the intru-
sion detetion problem stands in the proposition of models (signatures) that
may have the apability to represent robustly and preisely the various intru-
sions that may be enountered. The role of a model is, on the one hand, to fous
on the request features that are relevant for intrusion detetion issues and, on
the other hand, to abstrat the feature values into the representation.
A wide range of log line models have been already proposed. Tombini et
al. [25℄'s anomaly model is a list of pairs linking the aessed ressoures and the
ombination of parameters that were used, if any. Sine web sites are organized
as trees, the global model an be represented by a simple tree struture. If the
requested anomaly detetor belongs to the anomaly model, the anomaly detetor
heks whether the ombination of parameters used is allowed or not. Kruegel
and Vigna [13℄ introdued an anomaly-based detetor of Web-based attaks.
They proposed several intrusion detetion models based on request features:
attribute length distribution, attribute harater distribution, Markov model of
the struture of the query attributes, attributes order speiations, . . . Ingham
et al. [11℄ use a deterministi automaton to model the sequene of tokens
1
.
Bolzoni et al. [4℄ reently proposed to use regular and irregular expressions
models. Cheng et al. [5℄ propose to prevent attaks by monitoring the user
behavior with templates modeled by Markov models. In [22, 27℄, lustering
tehniques are used to onstrut dynamially a model of normal behavior as a
set of lusters based on the harater distribution feature.
To the best of our knowledge, no session model has been proposed so far.
Nonetheless, it must be related to the reent interests in alert orrelation [6℄.
Several tehniques, espeially Bayesian Networks or ausal networks, are used
to ombine alerts and to reognize intrusion plan [18℄ or senarios [17℄.
1
Tokens are semanti units of the URL separated by spei haraters ('', '?', '&')
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2.4 Advaned IDSs
In this paragraph, we review some speiities of advaned IDSs : 1) the om-
bination of diagnoses and 2) the adaptation.
2.4.1 Combining the results of intrusion detetors
It is generally admitted that the ombination of several intrusion detetors
(i.e. forming an ensemble of IDSs) an ahieve a better performane [2℄. The
intrusions an be better deteted by ombining several piees of information
that are known to be omplementary. Complementary aspets an be observed
along four axes:
 information that omes from distint IDSs distributed on the loal network
 information that is gathered from dierent kind of logs: dierent OSI lay-
ers (e.g. TCP/IP pakets, HTTP logs, . . . ) and/or dierent appliations,
soures (system ommands, database, web server, . . . ).
 information that is extrated from the same soure but through dierent
information lters (e.g. logs attributes),
 information that omes from systems with dierent seurity poliies
(e.g. Signature-based vs Anomaly-based, or Anomaly detetion vs Mis-
use detetion [25℄).
The rst two axes use several information soures, while the last two axes
ombine the information obtained from only one soure but from dierent points
of view and with the aim to extrat as relevant information as possible from
this soure.
The rst two axes enable the proposition of an arhiteture to detet and
prevent attaks in loal area networks. The main idea is to entralize the in-
formation that omes from several existing tools in order to make the detetion
more robust. The system of Tsian et al. [24℄ merges alarms that omes from sev-
eral network-based IDSs and host-based IDSs deployed on the loal network. It
uses the Dempster-Shafer [21℄ for data fusion. Gu et al. [10℄ propose a deision-
theoreti alert fusion based on a likelyhood ratio test (LRT). In a global area
network, a ollaborative approah [15, 26℄ to intrusion detetion aims at giving
a global view of the network attak ativity. Augmenting the information ob-
tained at a single site with information gathered from the network an provide
a more preise model of an intruder's behavior. For instane, the Worminator
[15℄ is a P2P ollaborative approah to the intrusion detetion.
The last two axes are widely used in ase of rih and strutured data suh as
aess logs. Sine early work on web attak detetion [13℄, it has been notied
that some aess log line attributes are more eient to detet some attaks
than others. Similarly, some attributes generate more false alarms on some
normal data. A method based on a single attribute would be unable to detet
robustly and aurately all the attaks that an be enountered on web servers,
and it may be fairly easily irumvented by new attaks reated by maliious
lients who an hide their intrusions by avoiding the traes they know to be
detetable through some monitored features. To over a wide range of attaks
and to detet most intrusions, the Web IDS must analyze several attributes and
ombine the results of the analysis. For instane, the system of Kruegel and
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Vigna [13℄ omputes an anomaly sore using by a weighted sum of anomalous
probabilities.
2.4.2 Adapting an IDS
Interation modes between a lient and a web server are highly dynami. So, the
features of normal and abnormal behaviors may hange rapidly neessitating the
adaptation of the monitoring system. Adapting an IDS aims at 1) progressively
improving the detetion reliability, and 2) at aquiring the apability to detet
new kind of intrusions. We fous our attention on the disovery of new kinds of
intrusion.
Pratially, a Web IDS (e.g. ModSeurity [19℄) requires a lot of human a-
tions, mostly tedious, whih restrit the IDS reativity. To detet new kinds
of intrusion, administrators must update manually the list of intrusion patterns
from signatures elaborated by experts. It appears to be strongly desirable to
automatize (a part or the totality of) the disovery of new kinds of intrusion,
the onstrution of signatures and the eetive update of the IDS.
HoneyComb [12℄ is a NIDS that failitates the disovery of new kinds of
intrusion by using HoneyPot. A HoneyPot is a deoy omputer resoure. Sine
there are no entry points for users to interat with these systems, ativities on
HoneyPots is onsidered suspiious by denition. Ativities of entities attak-
ing HoneyPots are logged to identify suspiious behaviors and to automatially
extrat intrusion signatures.
Another kind of approah aims at adapting the intrusion signatures on-line.
Bojani et al. [3℄ propose to use HMM for intrusion detetion in system om-
mand sequenes. In this method, normal and abnormal (intrusions) behaviors
are modeled by HMMs. If a sequene is suspeted as being non probable with
respet to known sequenes, additional analyzes are performed. If these new
analyzes tend to show that the sequene does not orrespond to an intrusion
then the HMMs linked to normal behavior are updated, else HMMs assoiated
to intrusions are modied or a new HMM is reated. In [23℄, Srinoy proposes to
use SVM intrusion models assoiated to a swarm intelligene tehnique enabling
a dynami adaptation of intrusion models. Wang et al. [27℄ are onfronted to
the same onept drift issue as us and propose an adaptive Web intrusion dete-
tion system based on outlier detetion with the anity propagation lustering
algorithm and an outlier reservoir that gathers potential intrusion waiting for
further analysis.
3 System overview
A Web server reeives a stream of HTTP requests. For eah new arriving
request, the adaptive multi-diagnoser system onstruts a diagnosis labelling
the request as intrusive or not. If the request is not intrusive, then it will be
proessed normally by the server. In parallel a meta-diagnoser observes the
diagnosis proess and an trigger the adaptation of the diagnoser based on the
urrent diagnosed request. Figure 3 illustrates the system arhiteture.
Our diagnosis approah relies on a multi-diagnoser arhiteture, i.e. several
diagnoser agents ontribute to the global diagnosis. All the diagnosers diag-
nose the same (sub-)problem by dierent methods and from dierent features
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Figure 3: System overview. The multi-diagnoser arhiteture onsists of 4 di-
agnosers. The deision of the red, unhappy, diagnoser is inonsistent with the
deisions of other diagnosers. Consequently, the meta-diagnoser may propose to
adapt this diagnoser. The global diagnosis is used to blok the request or not.
extrated from observations taken at dierent time points or at dierent loa-
tions. As a onsequene, the global diagnosis is elaborated from partial and
redundant diagnosis results.
Considering that no absolute referene is available, a diagnosis mistake is
deteted by identifying the inonsistenies between diagnosers. The redundany
of a set of diagnoses is used by the meta-diagnoser to monitor the need for
adaptation. Our idea is to use the several partially overlapping views of the
system. Due to the fat that views are partially redundant, they must be
onsistent on the ommon parts. If not, it an be onluded that some hange
is ourring in some part of the system. For example in the medial domain, at
a partiular time the fever severity (high, average or low) of a patient should
be the same though it is omputed by dierent means. If the diagnoses are
not onsistent (here, the onsisteny means fever severity equivalene), it is a
good indiation that at least one of the models should be adapted so that the
diagnosers will have a better behavior in the future.
The meta-diagnoser is in harge of analyzing the output of the diagnoser
agents, of deteting some inonsistenies, of loating the diagnosers rising prob-
lems and of proposing ations to improve them by self-adaptation.
4 An adaptive multi-diagnoser system for intru-
sion detetion
As mention in Setion 2.3, models are important to detet intrusions robustly
and preisely. Moreover, our aim is to provide automatially the models to ad-
ministrators and to avoid handmade models. To this end, we fous our attention
on models that are learned from datasets of labeled log lines.
Eah model fouses the diagnoser attention on a spei feature of the log
line. Several features (e.g. request length, harater or token distribution, sta-
tus ode, et.) are extrated from observations ontained in the log lines at two
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abstration levels, line and session. These features are ommonly used for intru-
sion detetion [13℄. For instane, harater or token distribution may be useful
to distinguish maliious requests from normal ones. Some maliious requests
use the URL (espeially parameters to sripts) to send intrusion instrutions to
the target server. A pereptible hange of harater distribution ould denote
the use of suh suspet instrutions.
For example, to diagnose the last request of Figure 1, the features would be
the following:
 harater distribution of the URL in the request : 'a': 1, 'b': 0,
'': 3, 'd': 1, 'e': 3, ...
 token distribution of the URL in the request : 'sripts': 1, 'aess.pl':
1, 'user': 1, 'johndoe': 1
 ratio of the errorful status ode in the session : error ratio (200):
0.5
 harater distribution of all the URLs in the session : 'a': 2, 'b': 0,
'': 6, 'd': 1, 'e': 4, ...
A typial harater distribution (resp. token distribution) is onstruted
from examples as the mean of eah harater (resp. token distribution) our-
renes. Note that the feature spae dimension is 256 for harater distribution,
but is innite for token distribution. Models based on the ratio of errorful status
ode in sessions make use of a Gaussian distribution model and are represented
by the parameters (σ, µ) of the Gaussian.
In this setion, we present a proposal for an adaptive web intrusion detetion
system. In Setion 4.1, we introdue the intrusion detetion using model-based
diagnoser agents. Then, in Setion 4.2, we explain how the agents diagnoses are
ombined. Finally, in Setion 4.3, we detail the adaptation layer of the system.
4.1 Model-based diagnoser to detet intrusion
A model-based diagnoser onstruts a diagnosis about the urrent request a-
ording to its own model. Our denition of diagnosis is inspired by the Dempster-
Shafer (DS) theory of evidene [21℄. This hoie is justied by the fat that the
diagnosis has to take into aount the unertainty oming from the partial views
that the dierent agents have on the observed system. To this end, the quanti-
tative representation of a diagnosis and the expliit management of unertainty
in the DS theory are relevant. Moreover, as a fusion theory, it provides a strong
solution to ombine diagnoses as required by our multi-diagnoser arhiteture.
4.1.1 Diagnosis with Dempster-Shafer theory of evidene
A diagnosis expresses the more or less ertainty in any of eah status that an be
assoiated to the urrent request: normal (N), intrusive (I), or even unknown
(U) e.g. when the unertainty is too high. This notion of diagnosis is formalized
in the Dempster-Shafer (DS) theory of evidene.
Denition 1 A diagnosis d is a normalized distribution of masses on Ω =
{N, I, U}:
d : Ω 7→ [0, 1],
∑
A∈Ω
d(A) = 1
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For all A ∈ Ω, d(A) expresses the belief whih supports the laim that the
urrent request is of status A. The preferred andidate in Ω−{U} is alled the
diagnosis deision and it is unique.
Denition 2 The diagnosis deision, dd, is the element of {N, I} assoiated
to the diagnosis d having the maximal belief:
dd = arg max
A∈{N,I}
(d(A))
maxA∈{N,I} (d(A)) gives the belief in the diagnosis deision.
Note that the diagnosis deision annot be U , but the mass d(U) modies
the belief in the diagnosis deision: the greater d(U), the more unertain the
diagnosis.
4.1.2 Model-based diagnosers
A diagnoser is haraterized by its model. The model desribes the diagnosti
knowledge used by the diagnoser to ompute its diagnosis from a subset of the
observations. Eah diagnoser has its proper and partial point of view on the
system.
Denition 3 A onrete diagnoser agent (CDA) is haraterized by its
mode M where M ontains two parts: the submodel of normal requests MN
and the submodel of intrusive requests MI .
In a bootstrap phase, the submodels are learnt from sets of labelled examples
(normal and intrusive requests). The preision p of the model is omputed as
the ratio of orret diagnoses on the learning sets.
While diagnosing the log stream, eah CDA omputes its diagnosis d from
the distane between the urrent request (R) and the submodels: d(N) = ‖R−
MN‖, d(I) = ‖R−MI‖. The unertainty mass, d(U), is given by 1− p, where
p is the model preision. Finally, the diagnosis is normalized. The distane
‖. − .‖ depends on the request feature that is used. For harater and token
distributions, the model distane to a request is the eulidean distane, and for
the ratio of errorful status ode, it is the ratio probability given by the Gaussian
distribution (i.e. Nσ,µ(ratio)).
4.2 Multi-diagnoser arhiteture
A multi-diagnoser arhiteture an be seen as a multi-agent system in whih
the agents are diagnosers. In order to ombine the diagnoses, we introdue
another kind of diagnoser agents, the virtual diagnoser agent (VDA). They aim
at merging the diagnosis of several other agents. As a onsequene, the agents
are organized in a hierarhial struture speifying the fusion sheme from the
CDA diagnoses to the global diagnosis of the urrent request. The agents and
their hierarhial struture ompose the multi-diagnoser arhiteture.
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4.2.1 Virtual diagnoser agent
Denition 4 A virtual diagnoser agent (VDA) Dv is represented by a pair
〈D,⊕〉 where D is the set of diagnoser agents that provide the input diagnoses
to Dv and ⊕ is a ombination operator used by Dv to ompute its diagnosis.
A VDA onstruts a diagnosis by ombining diagnoses that have been on-
struted by its related diagnoser agents (onrete or virtual) as dened inD. It is
virtual in the sense that it is not diretly related to onrete observation soures.
The ombination operator ⊕ denes how to onstrut the VDA diagnosis from
the diagnoses of the diagnosers of D. In our ontext, the Dempster-Shafer om-
bination rule is used. For all subset A ∈ Ω, the ombination of diagnoses d1 and
d2 is omputed by:
d(A) = (d1 ⊕ d2)(A) =
∑
B∩C=A d1(B)d2(C)
1−
∑
B∩C=∅ d1(B)d2(C)
.
The Dempster-Shafer ombination rule is assoiative, thus the denition an
be easily extended to the ombination of more than two diagnoses. Variants of
the Dempster-Shafer ombination rule exists [28℄ and ould be used as well.
4.2.2 Multi-diagnoser arhiteture
Denition 5 A diagnosis ombination graph (DCG) is a direted ayli
graph where nodes represent diagnoser agents and edges speify the ommunia-
tion ow of diagnoses between agents. Nodes with no desendants, alled leaves,
are CDAs and other nodes are VDAs. Among VDAs with no anestors one is
designated as the root node and represents the global diagnoser.
Denition 6 Amulti-diagnoser arhiteture is represented by a tuple 〈C,V , G,R〉,
where C is a set of CDAs, V is a set of VDAs, G is a DCG, and R is the virtual
diagnoser related to the root of G. The diagnosis omputed by R provides the
global diagnosis of the system.
The diagnosis is performed reursively through the DCG: the root VDA
triggers its hildren for monitoring. If a triggered hild is a VDA, it triggers
in turn new diagnosis agents; if a triggered hild is a CDA, it omputes a new
diagnosis based on its model and the urrent observations. One its diagnosis
is omputed, a CDA ommuniates its diagnosis to its anestor (a VDA) whih
will ombine all diagnoses sent by its hildren. Finally, the root VDA ombines
the diagnoses olleted from its hildren and ompute the global diagnosis.
The ombination graph we use to detet Web intrusion (f. Figure 4) makes
expliit diagnoses based on the session view and diagnoses based on the log
line view: the diagnoses of the Request-CDAs (resp. the Session-CDAs) are
ombined by the Request-VDA (resp. the Session-VDA) and the Root-VDA
ombines the diagnoses of the Request-VDA and the Session-VDA.
4.3 Adaptive multi-diagnoser system
4.3.1 Integrity onstraints
The meta-model used for meta-diagnosis is represented by a set of integrity
onstraints that must be satised by the diagnoses omputed by CDAs and
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Figure 4: Diagnosis ombination graph (DCG) for HTTP intrusion detetion.
Integrity onstraints are illustrated by bold red arrows.
VDAs. Integrity onstraints express temporal, spatial or strutural properties
of the observed system.
Denition 7 An integrity onstraint IC on CDAs or VDAs D = {D1, . . . , Dn}
is a tuple 〈D, c,MDCSIC〉 where
 c is a set of onstraints between the diagnoses of the diagnosers in D,
 MDCSIC ⊂ D is the meta-detetion oniting set, i.e. the set of the
possible soures of integrity violation.
 D \MDCSIC is the set of referene diagnosers.
The goal is to distinguish intrusive vs non intrusive sessions, rst, and then
to distinguish intrusive vs non intrusive requests. The diulty is then to be
able to separate intrusive and non intrusive requests inside an intrusive session.
To simplify the problem we assume that every requests in an intrusive session
is intrusive. We are onsious that this assumption is too oarse but it ould be
relaxed later by supposing that a session is intrusive if it ontains a high ratio
of intrusive requests. Note, however, that this assumption is not diretly used
for omputing the diagnosis but for determining whether a diagnoser should be
adapted or not. So, to design the meta-model for intrusion detetion, we assume
the following property for sessions: every request of a session is of the same type
as the session it belongs to, e.g. if a session is intrusive (I), then all the requests
should be intrusive. This assumed property is exploited by the meta-diagnoser:
when a session predits an intrusion whereas a request from the same session
predits a normal behavior an inonsisteny should be reported. The onverse
situation may also our.
In the ontext of Web IDS, the assumed property is exploited to dene two
integrity onstraints: ICr= and IC
t
=. IC
r
= (resp. IC
t
=) is satised if the diagnosis
deision of the Request-VDA (resp. Session-VDA) is the same as the diagnosis
deision of the Root-VDA. If ICr= (resp. IC
t
=) is not satised, the MDCS
inludes all the Request-CDAs (resp. Session-CDAs). Figure 4 represents these
ICs. The red bold arrows that link an integrity onstraint node to diagnosers
node represent the diagnosers involved in the onstraint. The red bold arrows
with double arrows identies the diagnosers of the MDCS. Diagnosers that are
not in the MDCS are referene diagnosers: their diagnoses will not be ontested.
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4.3.2 Meta-diagnosis
A meta-detetion oniting set indiates that at least one of its elements is
inonsistent with the others. The next step is to loalize whih diagnoser is
responsible of this inonsisteny and should onsequently be adapted.
Denition 8 The meta-diagnosis set (MDSIC) for an integrity onstraint
IC is the set of agents to adapt if IC is not satised.
In our ase, we assume rstly that the fusion performed by VDAs annot
be responsible of inonsistenies. Thus, the defetive diagnosers must be found
among the CDAs. Seondly, we onsider that all the leaves that are desendants
of the MDCS nodes involved in a violated integrity onstraint an be suspeted.
As a onsequene, the meta-diagnosis set for an integrity onstraint IC is the
set of all the CDAs whih are in MDCSIC = {Dc1, . . . , D
c
n} ∪ {D
v
1 , . . . , D
v
m
} or
whih are desendants of at least one Dvk ∈MDCSIC .
In ase of inonsisteny, the urrent global diagnosis is omputed one and
labelled as unertain. This label advises the user to not trust the urrent diag-
nosis until a new trustable one, omputed with adapted CDAs, will be provided
in a near future.
4.3.3 Adaptation
The nal step to get a fully self-adaptive multi-diagnoser system is to have means
to adapt the defetive CDAs from the meta-diagnosis. To this end onrete
diagnoser agents are enrihed with adaptation funtions.
Denition 9 An adaptive onrete diagnoser agent (ACDA) is repre-
sented by a pair 〈M, fA〉 where M is the model of a CDA and fA is a model
adaptation funtion.
Denition 10 A referene diagnosis deision ddr is omputed by ombin-
ing the diagnoses provided by the referene diagnosers of an integrity onstraint
IC.
One, the meta diagnosis has identify the ACDAs to adapt, a referene
diagnosis deision ddr is omputed by ombining the diagnoses provided by
the referene diagnosers of an integrity onstraint IC. For example, the integrity
onstraints noted ICr, of the Figure 4, the referene diagnoser is simply the
global diagnosis (onstruted by the root-VDA). In this ase, there is only one
referene diagnoser, then it is not require to ombine several diagnoses.
The referene diagnosis deision ddr related to an unsatised IC is pro-
vided to the ACDAs in the MDCSIC for adapting their model. Continuing the
previous example, diagnosis deision is provided to the Request-ACDAs (the
request-VDA an not be adapted). Eah agent uses it own adaptation fun-
tions with the urrent request and ddr as parameters. Pratially, if ddr = I
(resp. ddr = N), then the revised submodel MI (resp. MN) is omputed by
a weighted averaging of the observed request feature (harater distribution,
token distribution, ...) and the old model MI (resp. MN).
Denition 11 An adaptive multi-diagnoser system is a pair 〈D,MD〉,
where D is a multi-diagnoser arhiteture whose ACDAs are adaptive and MD
is a meta-model of D.
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In our ase, the meta-model MD is a set of integrity onstraints.
4.4 Example
Figure 5 illustrates the propagation of diagnoses along the DCG. The proess
begins by the omputing of the onrete diagnosers of the ACDAs, the results
of whih are given at the bottom of the gure. The diagnosis of the VDAs
are omputed next by ombining the suitable diagnoses applying the Dempster-
Shafer rule. In this example, the two ICs are satised beause the diagnosis
deision of the Root-VDA and the Request-VDA or the Session-VDA are the
same : they onlude that the diagnosis deision is N and, so, the Root-VDA
reports that the request is normal. Note that the diagnoser DrCD and D
r
Token
disagree, but there is no IC to onlude on the dysfuntion of one of them. The
meta-model assumes that it is quite normal to have inonsistent diagnoses at this
level and the inonsisteny is solved by using the Dempster-Shafer ombination
rule for the fusion of the ontraditory diagnoses.
Figure 5: Diagnoses illustration (without adaptation). For eah diagnosers,
the 3d vetor gives the diagnosis (masses distribution of N, I and U). The bold
number is the highest belief and its position in the vetor indiates the diagnosis
deision.
Figure 6 illustrates the ase of a diagnosis whih leads to an adaptation. We
just hanged the diagnosis of the ACDA DrToken. In this ase, the Root-VDA
diagnosis deision is I but it is not equal to the Session-VDA diagnosis deision
(N). Then, the integrity onstraint ICt= is not satised. The onsequene will
be the adaptation of the relevant submodels of ACDAs DtCD and D
t
Status.
5 Experiments
The system, alled LogAnalyzer
2
, is fully implemented in C++. The main ob-
jetive of the system evaluations is to show that the multi-diagnoser approah
of model adaptation improves the system performanes (i.e. preision and sen-
sitivity), on the one hand, and enables the disovery and the eetive use of
new kinds of intrusions, on the other hand.
2
see http://www.irisa.fr/dream/LogAnalyzer/ for more information.
RR n° 6989
18 Guyet & al.
Figure 6: Diagnoses illustration (with adaptation). ICt= is unsatised, D
t
CD
and DtStatus will be adapted.
5.1 Data and experiments
We olleted two large data sets of HTTP aess logs on the main Apahe server
of two researh institutes in July 2007 and June 2008 during 1 month (about
10 million of requests). A preproessing step onsists in ltering out bots and
known non intrusive requests (e.g. requests to stati ontents: .html, .jpg, .pdf,
. . . ) led to a data redution. Only 4.66% of the original requests remained in
the logs after ltering. The dataset was also heked to verify that it ontained
no intrusion.
For eah experiment, 1 million requests, orresponding to several days of
reording on our server, were extrated from the real HTTP log free of in-
trusion. Then, some session, 400 on average, ontaining 20 intrusive requests
(on average) were introdued at random positions. The intrusive requests were
hosen randomly among 239 known intrusive request examples from the Nikto
intrusion database [1℄. Among them, a subset of 203 known intrusive request
examples were manually seleted to be used for learning the initial ACDA mod-
els. The other 36 intrusive requests were used for building instanes of new
kinds of intrusion that ould be enountered during monitoring.
For eah request, we ompared the global diagnosis deision to the known
status (intrusion or normal) of the request and it were lassied among :
 the false positives (FP) : normal requests that have been diagnosed as
intrusive,
 the false negatives (FN) : intrusive requests that have been diagnosed as
normal,
 the true negatives (TN) : normal requests that have been diagnosed su-
essfully as normal,
 or, the true positives (TP) : intrusive requests that have been diagnosed
suessfully as intrusive.
We segmented the log in 100 bathes of 10.000 requests. For eah bath,
we ounted the number of FP, TP, FN and TN ourring in the bath, and we
omputed the following monitoring performane indiators:
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Diagnosis time Adaptation time
Logline harater distribution 31 2
Logline tokens distribution 16'11 6'10
Session harater distribution 42 ǫ
Session error proportion 21 ǫ
Global 23'48
Table 1: Cumulate time spend by agents (or the system) to diagnose or to adapt
the 1 million requests. epsilon means less than 1 seond.
FP FN TP TN DR FPR F-
Measure
With adapta-
tion
2091 530 2018 997831 0.79 0.002 0.61
Without
adaptation
21838 73 2461 978098 0.97 0.022 0.18
Table 2: Performane indiators omputed with the diagnoses of the 1 million
requests + 2534 intrusions
 Detetion rate (DR = TP/(TP + FN)), i.e. the aurrately reognized
intrusions.
 False Positive rate (FPR = FP/(FP + TP + FN + TN)),
 F-measure (F −Measure = 2 ∗DR ∗P/(DR+P ) where P = V P/(V P +
FP )).
In this way, it is possible to observe the evolution of performane indiators
over time.
In the experiments, we studied the auray of adaptations and the improve-
ment of the detetion performanes by adaptations. The experiments onsisted
in omparing diagnosis performanes with and without adaptation. Without
adaptation, the diagnoses were omputed aording to the priniple of our multi-
diagnoser arhiteture but the models of the diagnoser agents, learned from the
training set, do not evolve.
Experiments have been performed using a personal omputer (Intel Centrino
Duo T7500). It takes less than 25' to proess the 1 million request and it requires
less than 30 Mo of memory. The table 1 illustrates the omputing times we
obtained with a personal omputer (Intel Centrino Duo T7500).
5.2 Results
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the performane indiators with and without
adaptation. The Table 2 shows the performane indiators omputed with the
entire log. With adaptation, 205565 adaptations ourred. The adaptation a-
uray is more than 99%. This means that there are only few ases in whih the
adaptation is faulty (e.g. intrusive models are adapted with a normal request).
The main part of the adaptation (202203 ourrenes) onsists in updating the
normal model with a normal request.
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Figure 7: Evolution of the performane indiators over time. Figures in the left
olumn: with adaptation, Figures in the left olumn: without adaptation. The
rst two gures (upper), give the evolution of the FP, FN and TP. Figures in
the middle, give the evolution of the detetion rate and the false positive rate.
The last two Figures (lower), give the evolution of the F-Measure.
The rst two gures show that the adaptation redues drastially the number
of false positive diagnoses. The number of FP falls down at the very beginning.
This means that the adaptation is quikly eient, i.e. the system is reative.
The number of FP does not inrease thereafter. On the opposite, the number
of FP stays around 200 per bath (without adaptation it is only about 50 FP
per bath). Nonetheless, the true positive dereases a little while it is onstant
without adaptation. We an onlude that the adaptation makes our system
more spei to intrusion: it eiently redues the false positive rate, but it
redues a little the true positives. The number of false negatives are low in the
two ases.
The DR and FPR gures onrm that the detetion performanes with adap-
tation slowly dereases over time while it is onstant without adaptation. The
average of detetion rate is 80%. Moreover, we see that the FPR is low, on
average: 0.02 without adaptation and 0.002 with adaptation. Despite the only
four diagnosers, these performanes are quite good.
The F-Measure shows the global performanes of a diagnoser, it takes into
aount both the sensitivity and the preision of the diagnoser to detet the
intrusion. With adaptation, the F-Measure varies around 0.70(
+
−0.14), while
without adaptation, the F-Measure varies around 0.2(
+
−0.09). Moreover, we an
see that the global performanes of the system with adaptation is relatively
onstant despite the derease of the detetion rate. In fat, the number of
intrusion is very low, then the detetion rate has only little inuene on the
global performanes.
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We explain the FPR dierene with and without adaptation by the fat
that our evaluation set of intrusions holds some intrusions that are not in the
training set. With adaptation, the system disovers these initially unknown
intrusions and the signatures have been enrihed by this knowledge. On the
opposite, without adaptation, the initially unknown intrusions stay unknown
for the system and are not deteted (false negatives).
The derease of the true positive rate an be explained by an overlearning of
normal models. In fat, a lot of adaptation of the normal model are performed
and the models beome overtted. Consequently, some normal requests are less
reognized over the time. In fat, diagnosis is a normalized distribution, if the
normal mass is lower than before while the intrusion mass stays the same, the
intrusion mass may beome the biggest.
Based on these experiments, we an onlude that the adaptation improves
reatively the global performanes of the multi-diagnoser system and also main-
tains them at a high level. Moreover, our system disovers and detets dynam-
ially new kinds of intrusion.
6 Conlusion
We have presented a system for self-adaptive intrusion detetion from a stream
of HTTP requests. Our proposition assoiates a multi-diagnoser system and a
meta-diagnosis proess. Eah diagnoser agent onstruts its diagnosis aording
to its own point of view of the system. Considering that the views are partially
redundant, integrity onstraints an be expressed on diagnoses. The meta-
diagnosis proess onsists in using unsatised integrity onstraints to trigger
the adaptation of a subset of the diagnoser models.
The results of our experiments onluded that the multi-diagnoser arhite-
ture has good omputing and performane results. The adaptation improves
reatively the global performanes of the multi-diagnoser system and also main-
tains them at a high level. Moreover, our system disovers and detets dynam-
ially new kinds of intrusion. Nonetheless, we notied that the number of true
positives slowly dereases over time.
It is lear that more sophistiated methods an be used to loate the defetive
agents as for instane expert rules or any information on the soure of the
deteted problem. Other heuristi or informed methods as well as model-based
diagnosis methods (hitting-sets, prime impliants, et.) ould also be adapted
to ahieve this task.
We presented a general framework for adaptive intrusion detetion system
and its rst appliation in order to prove the validity of our proposal. A rst
perspetive will be to propose new diagnosers and new hypothesis to onstrut
alternative diagnosis graph. For instane, it may be based on models learnt on
the long term vs models learnt reently, it may ompare the diagnosis from a
two dierent web servers (with their own signatures) may be ompared, et. We
only used four diagnosers and the omputing performanes show that several
diagnosers may be added without analyzing time onstraints.
A seond perspetive is to design a more omplete IDS solution. We pre-
sented a ompletely autonomous system: not any manual ation is required.
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Nonetheless, in real situations, it is strongly reommended to use the admin-
istrator expertise. For example, administrator may be helpful to orret (not
neessarily frequently) the overlearning of some diagnosers that dereases slowly
the performanes of true positives diagnosis. In suh a ase, our system may be
used 1) as a tool adapting itself reatively to short term evolutions of the web
server environment and 2) as a tool supporting the administrator to adapt the
signatures base on the long term. To support the administrators, our frame-
work based on learnable signatures or models opens an new researh diretion
in whih the system would adapt their models from both their self-adaptation
and interative suggestion or orretion from the administrator.
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